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PREFACE 
 
POLIMP intends to facilitate a process to identify, for different policy and decision making levels, 
knowledge gaps about implications of possible directions of international and EU climate policies. The 
core objective is to cover these gaps with knowledge packages derived from a broad range of existing 
reports, research and climate policy decisions at, e.g., EU and UNFCCC levels. With these information 
packages, climate policy associated stakeholders will be better able to extract key policy conclusions. 
Through series of workshops these packages will be communicated with stakeholders and collect 
feedback. In addition, POLIMP will provide an overall, on-line platform for information exchange of a 
wider list of contemporary and future climate policy initiatives. 
 
Knowledge gaps will be identified for a range priority issues related to climate policy making in 
consultation with stakeholders, but as a starting point for discussion the following three (categories of) 
issues are suggested by the POLIMP partners: 
© What would different possible international climate policy scenarios entail for EU society, business, 
Member States and EU as a whole, in the terms of economic, social, and environmental impacts 
looking especially at likely reactions and resulting political acceptability for different groups such as 
those impacted by job losses and reductions in welfare as well as potential gains? 
© How can EU stakeholders deliberate in an evidence based manner about the advantages and 
disadvantages of these different scenarios? 
© How can EU and EU stakeholders learn from design and implementation of climate policies 
worldwide as well as share the experience the EU has gained in designing and implementing climate 
friendly actions? 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The just released natural science part of the 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change states with unprecedented boldness that “human influence on the climate system is 
clear” (IPCC 2013, p. 10). Human beings are responsible for growing greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere that lead to a temperature increase. Despite this scientific consensus, action to address 
global climate change has so far been insufficient. One of the main reasons for this insufficient response 
lies in the global and public good nature of climate change mitigation, and in the resulting complex net of 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders with differing interests regarding climate policy. This 
report aims at providing a current map of the stakeholders involved in the international climate policy 
process, including both governmental actors at all decision-making levels (international, national, 
subnational and local), and non-governmental actors representing different sectors of the economy and 
civil society.  
The report starts by briefly introducing the nature of the climate change problem and the historical 
development of international climate policy, before describing the main stakeholders involved in this 
policy process, including actors at the different governmental levels, actors within the EU, and non-
governmental actors. It then discusses the main general drivers of country governments’ positions in the 
climate change negotiations, which lays the ground for the more detailed description of the evolution of 
government positions over time up to the current pre-Warsaw situation. The last section finally presents 
conclusions and a possible outlook for future negotiations.  
Over the 20 years of international climate policy, a complex system of stakeholder interaction on multiple 
levels – the international, multilateral, national and subnational – has developed. Frequently, policy 
instruments for climate change mitigation are triggered by a cascade of decision-making. On each level, 
various interest groups try to influence decision-making. Despite all ups and downs of the negotiation 
process and the emergence of competing multilateral fora, however, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has remained the pivot, and national governments remain 
the main implementers of climate policy. Still, other international organizations, such as the International 
Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization and the Montreal Protocol have 
already been confronted with climate-relevant policy issues within their areas of work. In addition, less 
encompassing multilateral groups, such as the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate or the 
G 20 are increasingly discussing climate-related issues, although without leading to actual policy 
implementation yet. The EU, as a unique form of supranational institution, shows in a smaller setting how 
difficult it is to reach agreement on climate policy issues across countries driven by different interests, 
even if it has a stated goal of being a leader and a proactive global actor in climate protection. 
Multilateral financial institutions such as the World Bank have become important players as providers of 
climate finance, and even city governments have organized in transnational networks to try to combine 
efforts and share experiences in addressing climate change. Federal and other subnational units, in 
addition, serve as laboratories that experiment with new climate policy designs and that are sometimes 
more proactive than the central governments. 
Within the UNFCCC negotiations, a wide range of stakeholders is involved actively and provides 
different types of inputs – from position papers to analytical support of delegations. Stakeholder 
participation and diversity has continuously increased over time, and now includes actors representing 
environmental, business, local government, indigenous peoples, research, trade union, gender-related, 
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youth-related and farmer organizations, in addition to several UN bodies and other intergovernmental 
actors.  
In parallel to the increasingly complex set of involved actors, the two decades of UNFCCC negotiations 
have witnessed substantial changes in the positions of parties and, consequently, in the composition of 
the main negotiation coalitions, particularly among developing countries. Developing countries have 
become more and more differentiated with regards to several development and climate-related 
indicators, now including both countries with comparable (or even higher) development indicators as 
OECD members, and countries still dominated by subsistence and agriculture-based economies. As a 
result of this evolution, and of the failure of COP 15 in Copenhagen to bring about a new climate 
agreement, regional or special-interest subgroups of developing countries have started to become 
stronger and to defend positions that are distinctly different from those of the traditionally unified G 77. 
Even more recently, the Umbrella group of developed countries has practically disintegrated into 
countries that decided not to join a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, those that did 
(Australia and Norway), and the former Soviet bloc. 
It seems likely that this trend towards fragmentation of negotiation blocs and positions helps to pave the 
way to a new agreement that moves away from the Annex I – non-Annex I dichotomy of the 1990s to a 
continuum of differentiated engagement of all parties in terms of mitigation (and potentially other) 
commitments, although the most recent COP decisions of Cancun, Durban and Doha continued to apply 
a distinction between developed and developing countries. Of course, the overarching principles of the 
Convention will need to be respected, such as the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities. 
A future solution needs to incorporate these differences and deal with the equity and fairness question, 
and both progressive negotiators and experts external to the process have already made various 
proposals of how such a solution could look like. In addition, the balance of power between the different 
country coalitions, as well as the way in which the consensus decision-making rule under the UNFCCC 
is applied in the future, will also play an important role in whether and how a new agreement is reached. 
Only a success, as pursued by the EU, in reaching a 2015 agreement covering all countries would 
complete the repair process that became necessary after the failure of the Copenhagen conference, but 
this essentially means a loss of one decade compared to the situation if Copenhagen had delivered a 
treaty. For this new agreement, there is a clear tendency towards a “pledge and review” mitigation policy, 
although it is unclear how it will generate the level of ambition needed to put the world on a 2°C target 
path. A failure of the 2015 process would put the focus on options outside of the UNFCCC. To date, 
these options have not really performed well.  
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1 International climate policy as a multi-level and multi-stakeholder 
process 
 
1.1 Introduction and background to international climate policy 
The just released natural science part of the 5th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) states with unprecedented boldness that “human influence on the climate 
system is clear” (IPCC 2013, p. 10). Human beings are responsible for increasing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere that lead to a temperature increase. Despite this scientific 
consensus, action to address global climate change has so far been insufficient. One of the main 
reasons for this insufficient response lies in the global and public good nature of climate change 
mitigation, and in the resulting complex net of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders with 
differing interests regarding climate policy. This report aims at providing a current map of the 
stakeholders involved in the international climate policy process, including both governmental actors at 
all decision-making levels (international, national, subnational and local), and non-governmental actors 
representing different sectors of the economy and civil society.  
The report starts by briefly introducing the nature of the climate change problem and the historical 
development of international climate policy, before describing the main stakeholders involved in this 
policy process, including actors at the different governmental levels, actors within the EU, and non-
governmental actors. Section 2 then discusses the main general drivers of country governments’ 
positions in the climate change negotiations, which lays the ground for the more detailed description of 
the evolution of government positions over time up to the current pre-Warsaw situation in section 3. The 
last section finally presents conclusions and a possible outlook for the coming negotiations.  
As GHGs uniformly mix in the atmosphere regardless of the location of the emission, mitigation of 
anthropogenic climate change has the characteristics of a global public good: everyone benefits from the 
mitigation action implemented by others. While this is a challenge for international climate policy 
cooperation inasmuch as it can lead to “free rider” behavior, international cooperation also creates the 
chance of harnessing low-cost mitigation options across the world. This is different for adaptation to 
climate change, which is usually more specific to countries or regions and only in specific cases has the 
characteristics of a public good such as the development of drought-resistant crops. Some forms of 
adaptation are even entirely private goods, such as making one’s house storm-proof. 
The global public good nature of climate change mitigation as well as the dependence of most economic 
activities on GHG emitting technologies makes mitigation policy a “wicked problem” that cannot be 
addressed by one government alone and thus requires international cooperation. This is furthermore 
complicated by the absence of an overarching disciplinarian or “world government”, which implies that 
countries have the sovereign right to join or reject international climate agreements. International 
cooperation, however, is only the trigger for mitigation policies on the national, subnational and local 
(e.g. city) level. Coordinated action at all levels of government is necessary in order to harness the most 
cost-effective options available. Given this multi-level nature of mitigation policies, a large number of 
stakeholders with differing characteristics is involved. These stakeholders include governments, the 
private sector and civil society.   
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With growing recognition of the severity of the climate change issue over the last 20 years an array of 
mitigation policies have been developed on all levels. They have been shaped by the interaction of the 
different levels, but clearly been driven by negotiations under the UN framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). A short account of the key events follows below (for a detailed assessment of the 
events until the Copenhagen conference see Gupta 2010, for an overview until COP 19 in Warsaw in 
French language IFDD 2013, and for a current account of the status quo of positions in the run up to 
Warsaw see POLIMP’s D3.1 report).  
With the recognition of the relevance of the climate change problem by two large international scientific 
conferences in Bellagio and Villach in the mid-1980s, UNEP and the WMO joined forces to set up the 
IPCC in 1988 in order to synthesize the world’s scientific knowledge on climate change. In the same 
year, the Canadian government convened a conference in Toronto where representatives of 
governments for the first time discussed global GHG emission targets. When the IPCC’s 1st Assessment 
Report in 1990 concluded that anthropogenic climate change was a serious risk, the UN convened an 
intergovernmental negotiation committee (INC) to draft an international treaty on climate change, which 
was to be opened for signature at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992.  
During the INC process, many fault lines became visible that have persisted to this day. Non-OECD 
countries formed a coalition under the umbrella of the G 77, which developed the principle of “common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” based on the idea that different countries 
have made different contributions to the climate change problem, will suffer differently from its 
consequences, and have different capabilities to act. The practical implication of this principle became 
that industrialized countries should embark on mitigation, while the other countries would be exempt. In 
the course of international climate negotiations until the mid 2000s, this principle was upheld. Also, 
among industrialized countries positions started to differentiate. While the EU proposed a harmonization 
of policies and legally binding emission targets, the US and Pacific OECD states as well as Russia 
formed a coalition arguing for a “pledge and review” process in which each country would define its 
mitigation commitment as it liked. The Framework Convention agreed in the run-up to Rio thus remained 
rather weak as it only defined a voluntary target for industrialized countries of stabilizing CO2 emissions 
at 1990 levels by 2000. But it defined the ultimate aim of climate policy – to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic climate change – and set up a process of national reporting of GHG emissions. Moreover, 
it contained embryonic possibilities for international cooperation on mitigation, which later led to the 
emergence of market mechanisms.  
The UNFCCC was quickly ratified by a majority of countries and entered into force in 1994. At its first 
Conference of Parties (COP 1) in 1995, an unusual alliance between India (as leader of the ‘Green 
Group’ of 72 developing countries that excluded the oil-producing states) and the EU led to the decision 
to negotiate a protocol (or another legal instrument) to the UNFCCC (which then became the Kyoto 
Protocol) that would contain binding GHG emission reduction or limitation commitments by 1997 (IISD 
1995). Several factors made it possible to agree on the Kyoto Protocol (KP). In 1995, the 2nd 
Assessment Report of the IPCC had stated that ”the balance of evidence suggests a discernible human 
influence on global climate” which had led to a more accommodating stance by the US government at 
COP 2 in 1996. The US negotiators at ‘Kyoto’ also ignored a unanimous resolution by its Senate 
requiring developing country emission reduction commitments and Vice President Gore showed 
compromise spirit during the Kyoto negotiations in defining the numbers for industrialized country 
commitments. Moreover, the fact that Japan hosted the conference neutralized the Japanese tendency 
to prefer “pledge and review” type approaches. Another unusual alliance between Brazil and the US 
enabled agreement on an innovative market mechanism, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
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And finally, the skillful chairing of the conference by seasoned diplomat Raul Estrada was key in finding 
a compromise solution in the heated atmosphere of the final night.  
The KP defined differentiated emissions commitments for industrialized countries for the period 2008-
2012. Developing countries remained exempt from such emissions-related commitments but were 
allowed to generate emission credits through the CDM. The high ratification thresholds would almost 
have proven insurmountable: it took eight years to achieve the KP’s entry into force. An attempt by the 
US government to make the KP palatable to US Congress failed when in 1998 the Argentinean 
willingness to take up an emission target found a hostile reception by other developing countries (Bouille 
and Girardin 2002). In November 2000, COP 6 in The Hague failed due to a row between the EU and 
the other industrialized countries regarding use of forests in the context of the Kyoto commitments. Less 
than three months later, newly elected US president Bush declared that the US would not ratify the KP 
(Kahn 2003). This shock led to a rallying of the countries interested in a success of international climate 
policy (inspired by the EU-troika). Compromises on the contentious issues relating to forestry, 
compliance and use of market mechanisms were agreed at a re-convened COP 6 bis in June 2001 and 
COP 7 in Marrakech in October/November 2001 agreed on a 250-page rulebook for implementation of 
the KP. This allowed to set up the institutions overseeing the market mechanisms as well as checking 
compliance with the commitments. Still, the Protocol did not enter into force until after 2004, when 
Russia ratified it in response to heavy pressure from the EU that threatened to block Russian accession 
to the WTO.  
COP 11 in Montreal in 2005 (which also served as the first Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) 
opened the negotiations for the period after 2012, when the first commitment period of the KP would 
end. While the KP clearly contained the possibility to add further commitment periods, industrialized 
countries wanted a treaty that would engage developing countries in mitigation more than foreseen 
under the KP. It seemed that this path would be universally supported when COP 13 in Bali 2007 agreed 
on a “roadmap” that would lead to a new treaty by 2009. The decision to approach mitigation by 
developing countries in the form of voluntary “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs) that 
would be partially supported through finance and technology transfer from industrialized countries was 
seen as key breakthrough. In hindsight, Bali can be seen as high point of the universal approach to 
mitigation policy, also aided by the unprecedented attention to the climate change issue exemplified by 
the Nobel Peace Prize for the IPCC and Al Gore’s documentary on climate change in the same year. 
The eruption of the global financial crisis in 2008 led to a rapid decline of the salience of climate change. 
Despite a huge investment by the Danish hosts, COP 15 in Copenhagen 2009 turned out to be a 
disaster. Showing a lack of understanding of the traditional UNFCCC procedures, the Danish attempt to 
carefully lead the negotiation process by preparing its own text instead of facilitating the work of the 
parties angered developing countries and heads of state that were participating in hitherto 
unprecedented numbers (Meilstrup 2010). The emergence of the BASIC group of large advanced 
developing countries meant a geopolitical sea change, which eventually sidelined the EU. BASIC (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China) and the US showed unwillingness to engage in legally binding emission 
reduction commitments and thus hammered out a political deal that eventually brought back the idea of 
“pledge and review”, sweetened by promises of USD 30 billion of climate finance. But even that deal fell 
through in the final plenary due to opposition by a small ad-hoc alliance of some small island states that 
felt that the agreement was not ambitious enough with countries that objected to the nature of the 
process that led to the accord. 
Since 2009, the UNFCCC negotiation process has essentially tried to heal the wounds opened in 
Copenhagen. COP 16 in Cancun 2010 managed to get approval of the principles underlying the 
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Copenhagen Accord and officially underwrote the target to limit global warming to less than 2°C from 
preindustrial levels. COP 17 in Durban agreed on a 2015 deadline for negotiation of an agreement 
covering all countries and defining commitments from 2020 onwards. COP 18 in Doha agreed on a 2nd 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol covering 2013-2020. However, key fault lines remain. Only 
Australia, the EU and some other European countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, 
Norway, Switzerland and the Ukraine) have taken up new commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. While 
many countries have made pledges under the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancun decisions, they are 
difficult to compare and leave a gap of 8-13 billion tCO2eq. compared to the emissions path that would 
“likely” reach the 2° target. This gap has been growing over time (UNEP 2012). For the status of 
international negotiations to address the ambition gap, please see POLIMP report D3.1. 
 
1.2 The multi-layer nature of decision-making 
In line with the above-described multilevel nature of international climate policy, there has been a 
proliferation of institutions on various levels that deal with climate change issues. Figure 1 shows a range 
of these institutions as well as policy instruments defined by them. 
 
 
Figure 1. Multi-level institutional setting of climate policy 
Notes: Arrows denote institutions, ovals show key policies/incentives introduced by these institutions. The list is not exhaustive.  
ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization, IMO: International Maritime Organization, MP: Montreal Protocol, WTO: World 
Trade Organization 
GEF: Global Environment Facility, AF: Adaptation Fund, MBM: market-based mechanism, MF: Multilateral Fund 
MEF: Major Economies Forum 
ETS: Emissions trading scheme, CIFs: Climate Investment Funds, SCF: Spanish Climate Fund 
 
Institutions at the international level outside the UNFCCC dealing with climate change include other UN 
organizations, for example those overseeing international transport, ozone-depleting substances and 
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international trade. Emissions from international transport fuels had been exempt from any commitments 
under the KP. Due to the slow action of ICAO and IMO, the EU included international air transport in its 
emissions trading system from 2012 onwards, which led to diplomatic conflicts with the US and 
advanced developing countries. This EU action however also drove action by ICAO, which in its 
assembly in October 2013 agreed to develop a market-based mechanism covering air traffic emissions 
by 2016 which would enter into force from 2020. IMO already in 2011 had introduced mandatory energy 
efficiency standards for new ships. 
Under the Montreal Protocol (MP), phase-out schedules for replacement substances of the banned 
ozone-depleting refrigerants have been agreed. The MP Multilateral Fund finances phase-out activities 
in developing countries. Currently, negotiations about phase-out of HFCs – a replacement refrigerant 
that does not damage the ozone layer but is a strong GHG – are being undertaken. It is still not decided 
whether these negotiations should be continued under the MP or shifted to the UNFCCC. 
The WTO has relevance for mitigation policies that could be seen as trade barriers. So far, the WTO has 
not taken up any dispute relating to mitigation policies; but it is feared that such a dispute may lead to 
decisions that could severely limit the ability of states to unilaterally introduce mitigation policy 
instruments. 
It should be noted that except for the MP, compliance systems of the international institutions are rather 
weak.  
A number of multilateral institutions has emerged that deal with climate policy issues. The EU has 
probably the most relevant impact and will thus be discussed separately below. Due to multiplying 
complaints about the ineffectiveness of the complex UNFCCC process, a number of alternative 
approaches have been proposed. For example, the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate 
(MEF) was set up in 2007 by the Bush administration as the “Major Economies Meetings” and covers 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Russia, South Africa, South Korea, the UK, and the US and thus about 80% of global emissions. It 
however only serves as venue for discussion. The G 20 (which beyond the MEF members includes 
Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey) has stressed the need to phase out fossil fuel subsidies, but again 
has not led to implementation of specific policies. Transnational city networks such as ICLEI (formerly 
the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, now known as Local Governments for 
Sustainability) have gained importance but their impact with regards to emissions mitigation on the urban 
level has been mixed (Sippel 2011). Multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank play a key role 
in setting up both multilateral and bilateral climate finance vehicles.  
National level institutions remain critical in the context of mitigation policies, especially given that there is 
no world government that can enforce compliance with international agreements. While some states, 
especially “coordinated market economies” see mitigation policies as part of a green economy that could 
provide economic benefits in the long run, “liberal market economies”, as well as autocratic systems are 
much less likely to engage in mitigation policies (Lachapelle and Paterson 2013). In a number of 
countries, climate policy issues have already led to the fall of governments. The most conspicuous case 
is Australia where in 2007 opposition leader Kevin Rudd won the election on a platform that called for 
ratification of the KP that previously had been blocked by the government. Rudd’s administration ratified 
the KP but then failed to implement an emissions trading system, which led to his replacement by Julia 
Gillard who promised not to introduce a carbon tax. This promise led to her party losing the election in 
2013, as opposition leader Tony Abbott ran his campaign on the “carbon tax lie” and vowed to abolish 
the recently introduced carbon pricing scheme as soon as possible. Generally there is an increasing 
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polarization of political parties with regards to climate policy, with conservative parties increasingly 
opposing it. This trend was spearheaded in the US where the Republican Party is now so opposed to 
any climate policy that even state governors with high stature who implemented serious mitigation 
policies in their states had to “recant” and state that they no longer believed in climate change as a 
relevant issue. 
The failure of national governments to effectively address climate change has several explanations. 
First, climate change is a very complex, all-encompassing problem that affects many aspects of life and 
the economy. Thus, a country’s economic, industrial and energetic structure critically influences its ability 
to address its domestic drivers of climate change in a cost-effective manner. In line with this, traditional 
heavy industries in many countries initially formed strong interest groups opposing climate change 
action, or at best arguing for voluntary action (see section 1.3 for more details on the emergence and 
current status of interest groups). More recently, the economic crisis and ensuing recession have led 
national governments to redirect their efforts to saving their economies, leaving allegedly costly policies 
to address climate change at the side. Second, government institutions have a strong impact on the 
ability of a – maybe willing – government to adopt domestic climate-related policies and to adhere to 
international agreements, as has become clear in the case of the US inability to pass climate legislation 
in its polarized congress, despite the acknowledged willingness of the Obama administration to take 
action. Finally, beyond these failures related to economic and political structures, the failure to 
appropriately communicate the science of climate change and the implications of climate policies to 
societies is an additional reason. Al Gore’s film “An inconvenient truth” visualized the climate change 
catastrophes, but when citizens asked what they could do, no clear solutions were given. Discrepancies 
between different economists’ estimations of the costs of climate change and of climate-related policies 
contributed to polarization. Disinformation campaigns organized by anti-climate policy lobby groups and 
climate skeptics, including (false) allegations of fraud within the IPCC reinforced doubts. In a context in 
which economic difficulties increased and also an unwillingness to change consumption-based lifestyles 
prevails, citizens became increasingly receptive to policy makers and lobbyists saying that climate 
change was overrated. Without clear messages by science, by the media and the governments, and in 
view of the failure of the international political process under the UNFCCC, citizens in many parts of the 
world remain at best unconcerned, confused or unconvinced, and at worst opposed to climate change 
action. And without clear demands by the citizenship, reinforced by opposition from critical sectors of the 
industry, governments themselves remain unwilling to act. 
The subnational level plays an important role for experimentation. In large federal countries, states often 
try to introduce mitigation policies when the central government is hostile to climate policy. This has 
happened in Australia, Canada and the US, where states like New South Wales, Quebec and California 
unilaterally introduced emissions trading schemes. In India, renewable energy support policies differ 
widely across states, and in China provinces serve as laboratories for the design of emissions trading 
schemes. Currently, seven provincial schemes are under development and the experiences with them 
shall inform the design of a national emissions trading scheme from possibly 2016 onwards. 
To a minor extent, this effect can also be seen on a city level. Cities have become engaged in climate 
policy through the activities of networks such as ICLEI, the Climate Alliance, the Major Cities Initiative or 
the Covenant of Mayors. Progressive mayors try to impress their electorate by climate policy campaigns 
and by setting climate- or clean energy-related targets. Recent studies point out that such initiatives have 
the potential to meaningfully contribute to emission reductions, but there is limited empirical assessment 
of their effectiveness yet (UNEP 2013). The existing assessments are somewhat contradictory. Sippel 
(2011), for example, shows that the emissions performance of German cities closely follows the 
performance of the country as a whole, and that neither the existence of city-level mitigation action 
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plans, nor the institutionalization of city-level climate protection nor the membership within city networks 
appear to be related to such emissions performance. Cerutti et al. (2013) attach quite a high potential in 
terms of emission reductions to the Covenant of Majors initiative (almost 24% of total EU-27 annual 
emissions in the concerned sectors if all signatory cities take comparable action to those that have 
already submitted a Sustainable Energy Action Plan), even though after 5 years of existence of the 
Covenant emission reductions are only starting to materialize. A potential additional problem is that the 
lifetime of municipal mitigation policies can be short, as it is often linked to the political fate of the city 
government that introduced them. 
 
1.3 The EU as a unique actor between the national and international level 
The EU is the only regional integration organization recognized as a party to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol itself. Being unique in all aspects, the EU cannot be considered as a ‘state’ or as an 
‘international institution’, as it is a coalition of supranational along with intergovernmental attributes (Hix 
1999). It is a “political and economic partnership that represents a unique form of cooperation among 28 
member states” (Archick 2013, p. 1). The main institutions that operate behind the EU’s policy-making 
are the European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament (EP). 
Within climate policy, the EU’s role is that of a regional actor influencing policy making at national and 
international levels. It plays a primary role in drawing European climate change legislation and by 
actively engaging with the national climate change activities amongst its member states (Damro et al. 
2008). In addition, the EU is unique in that it always presents itself with one unified negotiating position in 
the international climate negotiations, which makes it sometimes hard for the EU to react with sufficient 
speed to sudden developments (as modifications require assurance of Member State support). Decision-
making largely remains centered around consensus among its member states in the Environmental 
Council.1 Despite requests from the Commission to co-ordinate the EU’s international climate policy 
position, the Council has not granted it this right, keeping its position as the principal governing body for 
external climate policy (Schunz 2011). It is the Council that gives the Commission a mandate to start 
negotiations. An ad hoc Council working group on climate change was formed in the mid-1990s. It 
reports to the Council Working Party on International Environmental Issues (WPIEI-CC), which then 
proposes draft international negotiation positions to the Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(Coreper). The proposal from the Coreper is then given to the environment ministers for a final round of 
debate, agreeing to a final position by consent (Pavese and Torney 2012). Thus before each negotiation 
round, the EU’s position is decided upon by unanimity in a Council meeting. 
The Lisbon Treaty in effect since December 2009 assigns the European Parliament with power to veto 
future international agreements, including climate agreements. Since then the EP can assert a more 
significant position in the EU’s external climate policy in the future (Groen and Niemann 2013). 
                                                
 
 
 
 
1 The Environmental Council is the specific configuration of the EU Council that deals with environmental issues. It is 
composed of the Member States’ environmental ministers.  
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Reaching consensus among the EU member states, or between the different European institutions has 
frequently been difficult. Conflict between countries with regard to climate policies has driven a wedge 
between the EU’s ambitions and its member states’ views, so that the positions adopted by the EU at the 
UNFCCC negotiations do not always reflect the envisioned leadership that the EU would like to display. 
One recent example of such conflict is the Commission’s proposal to ‘backload’ or postpone the 
auctioning of allowances on the EU ETS as a short-term solution to the falling prices of carbon. This 
proposal first failed in the EP, which caused a fall of 45% in the allowance price. Some environmental 
groups then wanted to give up the EU ETS in favor of ‘more direct emission reduction policies’ (Keating 
2013). However, after several rounds of parliamentary committee negotiations, finally in July 2013 the 
EP decided to approve the Commission’s proposal subject to certain amendments such as several 
compromises and declarations that such a move will not be taken again in the future (CleanTechnica 
2013).  
In another instance of conflict that directly affected the EU’s negotiating position, Poland opposed the 
EU’s plan of almost zero carbon power generation by 2050, due to its heavy reliance on coal. However, 
Poland was isolated as the resolution found backing from 26 member states indicating to the 
Commission that it can start working on its legislative proposals for 2030 (EurActiv 2012). 
More recently, the Czech Republic and Poland decided to slash subsidies for renewable energy, 
following Spain and the UK (Carney 2013). These decisions are potentially at odds with the EU’s climate 
and energy goals for 2020 and 2030. Germany, in a similar move, is considering reducing the 
exemptions on renewable energy price surcharges that were granted to large companies as a way to 
shield them from high energy costs in highly competitive industrial sectors. German households are 
becoming tired of having to cover the energy bills of businesses, and the exemptions are additionally 
being challenged by the EC as a potential breach of EU competition law (Belinksi 2013).  
In October 2013, the EU’s move to curb CO2 emissions from new cars to 95g CO2/km was put on hold 
after severe opposition from a German-led coalition that believes that manufacturers like BMW, Audi and 
Daimler will suffer due to these new regulations. Germany was supported in its stance by the UK, 
France, Portugal, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, Hungary and Czech Republic (King 2013). Earlier in 
September, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, had already cautioned the EU against stringent actions 
with regard to the car industry, claiming that the EU must keep in mind that climate change is a global 
effort and not impose burdens on its own industries (Hetzner 2013). 
These examples show that there are important cleavages with respect to climate policy across the EU. 
Accordingly, in its stakeholder engagement plan, as well as in its first screening of EU-level stakeholders 
(POLIMP reports D2.2 and MS1), POLIMP recognized the need to differentiate the climate policy needs 
and focus, as well as the relevant stakeholders across three broad European regions: Western and 
Northern Europe, Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. This recognition relies on the fact 
that these three regions embody different social, economic and political characteristics that in turn shape 
their governments’ and stakeholders’ perceptions, positions and actions with respect to climate policy. 
These examples also illustrate that not only EU and state-level governmental actors have an influence 
on EU policy- and decision-making, but also pressure groups (such as representatives of the automobile 
industry, or environmental groups) that are active at both the national and the international levels. In the 
recent past, pressures to tone down mitigation policies have increased, coupled with statements that 
they reduce the EU’s competitiveness. These pressures and struggles themselves are reflected in the 
positions that the EU adopts for the UNFCCC negotiations, which will be described in some more detail 
in section 3.2 of this report. 
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1.4 Relevant non-governmental stakeholders 
Of course, not only government representatives have a stake in the UN climate change negotiations. 
Climate change affects so many aspects of life and the economy, that a large number of extremely 
diverse interest groups try to influence the negotiations and have been actively involved in them (see 
e.g. Willetts 1996; Charnowitz 1997; Raustiala 2001; Willetts 2002; Betzold 2012). However, these 
groups only have an observer status at the negotiations, and do not have any decision-making power. 
Non-governmental stakeholders that have an interest in following the negotiation process can request to 
be admitted to attend the UNFCCC sessions as “observer organizations”. There are several categories 
of these observer organizations, including: 
© UN bodies and secretariats, such as UNEP, UNDP or the secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity;  
© Specialized international agencies, like the World Meteorological Organization, the Intergovernmental 
Panel for Climate Change, or the Global Environment Facility; 
© Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the International Energy Agency, or the Inter-American Development Bank; 
© Non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
This final NGO category is itself subdivided into nine constituencies, which seek to group, represent and 
coordinate the participation of the main currently recognized stakeholder and civil society groups 
(UNFCCC Secretariat 2011, Rietig 2011a): 
© Environmental NGOs (ENGOs): grouping all NGOs with an environmental focus, this is one of the 
original constituencies that was first recognized under the UNFCCC process. Many ENGOs are in 
addition grouped within the Climate Action Network (CAN), a worldwide network of over 800 
environmental NGOs engaged in avoiding dangerous climate change. With members in more than 90 
countries, CAN is organized in regional and national networks that seek to coordinate advocacy 
activities to increase their impact. ENGOs advocate for ambitious and legally-binding climate 
mitigation goals, and for a fair distribution of the costs of addressing climate change among all 
countries, taking into account developing countries’ need of financial and technical support (CAN 
International 2013).  
© Business and industry NGOs (BINGOs): the business constituency is the other original constituency 
within the UNFCCC process; it groups an heterogeneous set of private sector interests, ranging from 
fossil fuel producers and electricity generators, to heavy industry and producers of emissions-
intensive goods, to businesses that provide mitigation technologies or advisory services related to the 
carbon market. Due to this broad membership, BINGOs’ goals and interests are highly diverse and 
have evolved over time (Vormedal 2008). In the early 1990s, the business community, mainly 
comprised of fossil fuel producers and other emitters organized in the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) 
and the International Chamber of Commerce, held a strong opposition to climate regulation, and was 
successful in averting emission reduction obligations both internationally and in the US. In the mid-
1990s, however, some firms split from this coalition and started to advocate market-based 
approaches to climate change mitigation, working together with some liberal environmental groups 
such as Environmental Defense as part of the International Climate Change Partnership (Meckling 
2011). According to Meckling, this first division of the business community was crucial in moving the 
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US to support international emissions controls tied to emissions trading, and eventually also in 
dispelling the European opposition to carbon markets and driving the emergence of the EU ETS. It 
allowed finding a compromise between the earlier staunch anti-regulation position of businesses and 
the traditional pro command-and-control position of environmental groups and paved the way to the 
adoption of mandatory emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. By the end of the 1990s, 
a strong and growing pro-markets coalition emerged under the name of the International Emissions 
Trading Association (IETA), and the GCC was continuously losing political weight. Due to the 
dichotomy of interests within the BINGO constituency, it is always granted two speaker slots at the 
negotiations in order to allow each “sub-constituency” to be heard. 
© Local government and municipal authorities (LGMA): This constituency formed at COP 1 in 1995 to 
represent the interests of local governments in the UNFCCC negotiations, such as advocating for 
more visibility to the important role that local governments and cities need to play in combatting 
climate change. Within the LGMA constituencies, transnational networks of cities or local 
governments, such as ICLEI, play a leading role. Only recently, in COP 16 in 2010, the role of 
subnational and local governments as actual government stakeholders in the intergovernmental 
climate change negotiations was finally acknowledged in an official COP decision (nrg4SD 2011).   
© Indigenous peoples organizations (IPOs): IPOs formed their own constituency at COP 7 in 2001, 
mainly with the goal of advocating for indigenous land rights in the discussions related to forest 
conservation as a possible climate change mitigation strategy (Betzold 2013). 
© Research and independent NGOs (RINGOs): the RINGO constituency formed in 2003 with the aim of 
“developing sound strategies to address both the causes and consequences of global climate 
change” by means of independent research and analysis (RINGOs n.d.). RINGOs do not develop any 
positions but strive to provide high quality analytical input on issues that are critical in the negotiations 
(Rietig 2011a). 
© Trade union NGOs (TUNGOs): the labour organizations were recognized the status of a constituency 
in COP 14 in 2008, and advocate not only for the creation of green jobs, but also for a just transition 
for workers in the process towards a low-carbon economy, which takes into account the need to 
protect (e.g. through re-employment, alternative employment or compensation) workers employed in 
traditional industries that may be negatively affected by climate policy (Boggild 2010).  
© Women and gender NGOs (Women and Gender): The women and gender groups gained full status 
as a constituency at COP 17 in 2011, but have been active in the negotiations mainly since 2007. 
One of its greatest achievements so far has been the adoption of a COP decision on promoting 
gender balance and improving women participation in the climate negotiations and in bodies 
established under the convention (UNFCCC 2012b). 
© Youth NGOs (YOUNGOs): While the youth movement has been participating in the UNFCCC 
negotiations since their beginning, it only gained full constituency status in 2011. At the negotiations, 
youth groups work hand in hand with environmental NGOs and other civil society groups, to support 
the efforts to find an ambitious solution to the climate change problem. 
© Farmers NGOs (Farmers): The farmers group currently holds a provisional constituency status, which 
is expected to become full status at COP 19 in 2013. The constituency brings together civil society 
and non-governmental organizations focusing on agricultural issues related to mitigation of and 
adaptation to climate change, and its main goal is to raise the awareness about the importance of 
agriculture for the negotiations (Friis 2013).  
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These constituencies have each a focal point, which coordinates the interaction and communication of 
its members with the UNFCCC secretariat. While participation in a constituency is neither mandatory nor 
official, and does not preclude direct communication of NGOs with the secretariat, the large majority of 
NGOs (almost 90%) are affiliated with one of them. Among the admitted observer organizations that 
remain outside these constituencies there are, for example, faith groups and organizations of national 
parliamentarians (UNFCCC Secretariat 2011; Betzold 2013).  
The three largest constituencies, ENGOs, BINGOs and RINGOs, group about 80% of all NGOs; each of 
the other groups accounts for around 2% of all NGOs or less (see Figure 2). About 75% of the observer 
organizations are headquartered in Annex I countries, while only 25% are in non-Annex I countries. 
Figure 3 shows the geographical distribution of observer organizations by country of headquarters. 
 
 
Figure 2. Observer organizations by NGO constituency 
Source: UNFCCC 2013. 
 
The above figures clearly show that there is a large heterogeneity of interest groups involved in the 
UNFCCC process, and also that this heterogeneity has continuously grown, from two initial 
constituencies clearly defined to now nine of them. In addition, more and more organizations have 
applied and been granted observer status over time, as Figure 4 shows. This also illustrates the 
increasing relevance of the negotiations for new stakeholders, which seek to participate in them either to 
try to influence their outcomes, or to get first-hand information about their progress.  
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Figure 3. Observer organizations by country of headquarters 
Source: UNFCCC 2013. 
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Figure 4. Cumulative admissions of observer organizations to the UNFCCC 
Source: UNFCCC 2012a. 
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This growing interest in the negotiations among non-governmental stakeholders stems likely from the 
fact that the negotiations themselves have grown to become more and more encompassing thematically, 
which has itself also led to the emergence of an increasing number of specialized country coalitions 
defending particular interests in the negotiations. Thus, the multiplication of issues under negotiation 
apparently has led to the fragmentation of country coalitions (Betzold et al. 2012) and the diversification 
of non-governmental stakeholder groups engaged in the process.  
 
1.4.1 European stakeholder groups at the UNFCCC negotiations 
European non-governmental stakeholders are well represented at the UNFCCC negotiations: 562 
stakeholders with seat in an EU country are currently registered under the UNFCCC, representing 34.5% 
of the overall admitted observer organizations. Of these, the vast majority (89%), are located in a 
Western or Northern European country; 10% are located in Southern European countries and only 1% 
are based in Central or Eastern Europe. This geographic distribution, however, may be deceiving to a 
certain extent: on the one hand, an important number of these organizations have their seat in Brussels, 
which is an indication that they also carry out lobbying activities at the EU level, and thus probably 
represent interests across all of Europe; on the other, particularly for the case of business groups 
(broadly 20% of all EU-located observer organizations), many of these observers are actually broad 
business associations with membership across Europe or even the world.  
The different constituencies are represented in Europe in a broadly similar way as in the whole world: 
about 30% of admitted European organizations are ENGOs, followed by RINGOs (almost 30%) and 
BINGOs (almost 20%). The most important difference is that environmental groups are somewhat 
underrepresented, while business groups are slightly overrepresented. 
Figure 5 shows some detail about the thematic focus area of work of the registered European BINGOs, 
and makes clear that a broad diversity of European interests participates actively at the UNFCCC 
meetings, ranging from green industries (e.g. those related to renewable energy technologies and 
generation, energy efficiency and the carbon market), to large emitters (such as industry and the more 
traditional energy producers), to business sectors that only slowly start to relate to the climate change 
discourse (insurance, information and communication technologies, agriculture).  
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Figure 5. EU-based business observer organizations by thematic focus area 
Source: UNFCCC 2013. 
 
2 Drivers of government positions 
International relations theory suggests that domestic and international decision-making are intertwined in 
a two-level process (Putnam 1988). Similarly, we can assume that country positions in the international 
climate change negotiations are shaped both by the political process within each country, and by the 
international exchange between the different country delegations at the international level. An additional 
element that can influence delegation positions is the normative basis of international environmental law. 
Gupta (2012) argues that civil society pressure for common norms on equity and justice as well as 
climate change-related litigation by NGOs and public institutions in national or global courts could 
strengthen government support for norms over time. 
At both levels, knowledge of the role of pressure groups in influencing domestic and international 
decision-making is necessary for explaining these positions, too (Bang et al. 2005). 
At the national level, public choice theory (e.g. Olson 1971) suggests that government positions will 
typically be driven by the urban middle classes rather than by the masses of the rural poor. The reason 
is that governments usually provide more attention to those actors in the economy that are more vocal, 
organize better, protest more easily, or have the relevant financial means to support politicians who 
defend their preferences. Moreover, the urban middle class tends to benefit from a higher level of 
education, which allows them to understand the relevant problems and to compare the effect of 
alternative policies, in addition to increasing their organizational capacity (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 
forthcoming). 
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In one of the first applications of public choice theory in the context of climate change, Michaelowa 
(2001) identified the different groups of political actors such as companies, emitters of GHGs, climate 
protection industries, providers of adaptation or mitigation technology, environmental and development 
NGOs, media and voters who had unique self-driven interests regarding the issue of reducing emissions 
of GHGs. Based on this framework he establishes how each actor in a political economy benefits or 
accrues costs of following mitigation policies. Policy-makers and bureaucrats in charge of developing 
climate change mitigation policies will work keeping the various interest groups in mind. 
Clearly, a country’s core position in the negotiations is frequently driven by the strongest stakeholder 
groups dominating domestically – which establishes its position on the basis of its fear of economic 
losses from climate action (or inaction), or its expectation of economic gains from climate action (or 
inaction). Countries with a strong fossil fuel producing lobby typically oppose strong action against 
climate change, while countries with strong climate protection industries support ambitious mitigation 
goals. Countries with a high vulnerability to climate change may rather follow the demands from civil 
society, local governments or the agricultural industry struggling to cope with adaptation (and poverty 
reduction) needs, and thus advocate strong mitigation action and ask for financial support or even 
compensation payments to cover the climatic impacts they are already suffering. In addition, a 
government’s political orientation and ideology may be decisive in shaping a negotiation position, as is 
the case of the opposition to market-based approaches by some Latin American left-oriented 
governments. Dolšak (2001) additionally claims that political recognition given to governments – both 
domestically and internationally – for higher levels of commitment may encourage them to adopt 
mitigation policies in their own country. This holds especially true for democratic nations where a 
significant concern for climate change effects among voters may encourage governments to adopt 
climate-friendly policies. In other words, the degree of democratization along with considerable public 
concern relating to climate might be a driver of governments to take a firmer stance in climate change 
negotiations. 
But parties may not have a clear position on a specific issue in the negotiations to start with, due to lack 
of understanding of the issue or a low relevance to its domestic constituencies. For example, a 
developing country without a large share of forests may not have formed a domestic position about 
avoided deforestation (REDD+). In these cases, it is the negotiations at the international level that may 
be more relevant in influencing its positioning.  
At the international level, country representatives not only consider the preferences of their home 
constituencies with respect to the subject matter, but also how their positions and strategies will be 
received by their peers at the UNFCCC and by the international media (which will eventually also be 
observed by their own national citizens). In this context, not only the negotiating position’s relevance for 
domestic goals is important, but also its effect on other foreign policy goals, such as the demonstration of 
leadership capabilities, the maintenance of a good reputation, or logrolling – the exchange of favors (in 
this case, support for a position) with other parties, most frequently the members of the own coalition 
group (Michaelowa and Michaelowa forthcoming).  
In addition, also at the international level, transnational interest groups, such as those described above, 
engage in lobbying with the aim of influencing national positions and, eventually, final decisions. But the 
influence of these interest groups depends on their capabilities to access decision-makers and to lobby 
them effectively, and also on their rational decision whether doing so is cost-effective for them. For 
example, Rietig (2011b) discusses that the extent to which environmental NGOs can affect negotiations 
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depends on several factors such as personal competence, entrepreneurial strategies with regard to 
policies, whether they have “insider status” with government delegations and the phase in the 
negotiation cycle in which they try to offer suggestions to the negotiations. NGOs also pursue outsider-
strategies by means of organizing and partaking in mass protests. In contrast, business groups rely on 
their economic importance, their expertise and specialized knowledge, and on insider status among the 
policy community (Schlozman 1984; Atkinson and Coleman 1992). In addition, it can be established that 
interest groups refrain from lobbying if the costs of lobbying are higher than the intended achievements 
of the same. This happens particularly in the case where the interest groups’ interests are synced with 
the political stance they can lobby against, if lobbying is predicted to have an unfavorable effect, or if the 
probability of success is low (Gullberg 2008). 
Finally, several other factors also play a role for the ability of country representatives to effectively 
position themselves in the international negotiations. Despite the existence of a fund that aims to secure 
the participation of at least two delegates per country in all UNFCCC negotiations, small developing 
countries lack the resources to send sufficient representatives to be able to follow all negotiation groups. 
This makes it more difficult for them to understand and follow some of the highly technical issues being 
discussed. Language barriers are similarly problematic, particularly for small developing country 
delegations. Despite these limitations, governments may enhance their negotiation resources by 
organizing and staffing their delegations with skilled diplomats, including external experts from academia 
or the non-governmental sector with the aim of augmenting their internal power resources (Bailer 2012). 
The lack of resources of developing country delegations will be exacerbated if governments see the 
subsidy for delegation members as sinecure that can be granted as a favour. Given the low salaries in 
many developing countries, the daily UNFCCC subsistence allowance can equal a full monthly salary. 
Usually, this leads to a lack of continuity of delegation members as well as a lack of knowledge. It will 
however not actively damage the country’s position. But in extreme cases, governments grant places in 
their delegations and a voice to representatives of interest groups, whose positions may not be 
consistent with the interests of the country (see e.g. Allan 2010). 
Finally, outstanding personalities can make a difference. Chairpersons of COPs can achieve agreement 
if they sense on which issues governments will compromise, and where they will stand firm. During 
COP 1 in Berlin, the then German environment minister, Angela Merkel, played an instrumental role in 
getting parties to agree to the Berlin Mandate to negotiate binding emission reduction commitments that 
eventually led to the Kyoto Protocol. Two years later, the way in which Raul Estrada masterfully 
understood the map of interests on the last night of the Kyoto negotiations was probably crucial for the 
success of the KP. Similarly, Mexican foreign minister Espinoza creatively overrode the Bolivian 
opposition to the Cancun agreement and correctly gauged that all other parties would tolerate this 
courageous interpretation of the consensus principle. Maybe the Copenhagen fiasco could have been 
avoided if Danish prime minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen had been more skillful in chairing the final 
plenary where he once even wanted to call a vote, completely ignoring the UNFCCC’s consensus 
principle… These cases show that persons can make a difference if they are well-informed, respected 
and do not attempt to force through issues opposed by powerful governments (Jepsen 2013). 
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3 Mapping government positions 
 
3.1 The fragmentation of negotiation groups over time 
Over the two decades of negotiations in the international climate change regime, substantial changes 
have been observed in the positions of parties to the UNFCCC and, consequently, in the composition of 
the main negotiation coalitions, particularly among developing countries. Developing countries, as 
defined under the UNFCCC – i.e., those countries not listed in Annex I to the Convention – have become 
more and more differentiated with regards to several development and climate-related indicators: while 
some have become highly industrialized and have even joined OECD, others are currently among the 
top performers in terms of per capita GDP and the top “sinners” in terms of total or per capita GHG 
emissions. At the same time, many other developing countries remain dominated by subsistence and 
agriculture-based economies, and have become more and more aware of their high vulnerability to 
climate change impacts (see Michaelowa and Michaelowa forthcoming for a more detailed account of 
these differences).  
In addition, the climate change negotiations have grown themselves in complexity, covering more and 
more topics that are directly or indirectly related to climate change, and hence concerning more and 
more different interests (Betzold et al. 2012).  
These developments have not remained without effect on the negotiation behavior of parties to the 
UNFCCC. While initially all developing countries, despite potential differences in opinion, negotiated in a 
unified manner under the umbrella of the G 77 and China, this unity has slowly and gradually started to 
break apart. Already in the 1990s, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) started to advocate for 
special treatment for particularly vulnerable countries, with quite high success in comparison to their low 
level of political clout (Betzold et al. 2012). Another important actor, from the beginning on, was the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which has over time successfully slowed 
progress in the negotiations through procedural maneuvers, such as blocking the adoption of voting 
rules under the UNFCCC and thus forcing the use of consensus for any decision-making (Depledge 
2008).  
Despite this early differentiation, for almost 20 years the G 77 managed to present a unified voice in the 
UNFCCC discussions, with only a few defections such as Mexico and South Korea who founded an 
unusual coalition with Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the Environmental Integrity Group, a coalition 
characterized for progressive positions and cooperative attitudes, and for being the only one that bridges 
the separation between Annex I and non-Annex I countries. Mexico and South Korea joined this group 
as a way to portrait themselves as cooperative countries with strong domestic action to mitigate climate 
change, with the expectation of being able to avoid top-down emission reduction commitments being 
imposed upon them. 
It is mainly in the past four years, since COP 15 in Copenhagen, that regional or special-interest 
subgroups of developing countries have started to become stronger and to defend positions that are 
distinctly different from those of the G 77. Initially, the ALBA group of Latin American new socialist 
countries distinguished itself with a strong anti-markets position and with discourses advocating respect 
to the Mother Earth and the payment of the environmental debt by the industrialized countries. The 
BASIC group of countries, comprised of the large emerging economies Brazil, South Africa, India and 
China, emerged with the ambition of portraying themselves as leaders among the developing world and 
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with the goal of maintaining the firewall between Annex I and non-Annex I countries (see Hallding et al. 
2013 for a detailed account of BASIC’s formation and strategy). The Coalition of Rainforest Nations 
appeared as a group of countries interested in REDD+ activities and the provision of finance to support 
them; the Central American Integration System (SICA) emerged seeking to be recognized as a highly 
vulnerable region. As a reaction to ALBA, the more recent Association of Independent Latin American 
and Caribbean states (AILAC) was created, characterized by environmentally-ambitious domestic 
actions and international positions. It needs to be noted that already in 2010, as a reaction to the failure 
in Copenhagen, a larger group of small- and middle-sized progressive countries, including both Annex I 
and non-Annex I parties, started to coordinate negotiation positions and strategies in the framework of 
the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (see section 3.2.3). Finally, as a further reaction to AILAC 
and the Cartagena Dialogue, and again with the main goal of maintaining the strict division between 
industrialized and developing countries, the group of Like-Minded Developing Countries started to 
become active in late 2012, led by the BASIC countries but also encompassing members of ALBA, 
OPEC and other developing countries (Roberts and Edwards 2012; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 
forthcoming). 
Among the industrialized countries, the two most important and constant negotiation blocks are the EU 
(see description above) and the loose coalition of all other Annex I countries, in the early years 
JUSSCANZ, which did not include the Russian Federation or other former Soviet countries, and later the 
Umbrella group, which was joined by Russia and Ukraine. A first split occurred when Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein joined the Environmental Integrity Group. Norway also became highly progressive and 
lined up with the EU, despite remaining formally within Umbrella. A more recent development is the 
practical disintegration of the Umbrella group, into countries that decided not to join a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, those that did (Australia the EU and Norway), and the 
former Soviet bloc.  
Figure 6 (a) to (f) graphically shows the evolution of country coalitions and NGO constituencies in the 
UNFCCC negotiations over time.  
 
3.2 Positions prior to COP 19 
Figure 5 makes clear that a matrix of negotiation groups is emerging, each of them with specific 
positions on the different topics under negotiation, in particular with respect to the new post-2020 
agreement being negotiated under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action (ADP): mitigation ambition up to 2020, mitigation ambition post-2020, allocation of mitigation 
commitments across countries, finance, use of market mechanisms, adaptation and technology transfer.  
In this section, we present a brief overview of the positions of the most important negotiation coalitions 
discussed in the previous paragraphs, focusing on the most contentious issues that have given rise to 
the gradual fragmentation of country coalitions, particularly mitigation commitments. For a more detailed 
description of current positions on a broader set of negotiation topics, see the parallel POLIMP report on 
the current status of the negotiations (Deliverable 3.1), as well as Herold et al. (2013).  
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Figure 6: Country and NGO coalitions in the UNFCCC process 
 
3.2.1 Industrialized countries 
European Union 
Since the inception of official discussions relating to climate change on a global scale in 1991, the EU 
has endeavored to be a leader in climate change related negotiations (Gupta and Grubb 2000; Oberthür 
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2009). It has supported the UNFCCC and later the KP, in undertaking ambitious targets for mitigation of 
GHG emissions. 
As explained above, however, it is not always easy for the EU to keep up with this leadership ambition. 
The key (internally) contentious issues within the EU position for the UNFCCC negotiations are raising 
the ambition of its pre-2020 target from the current 20% reduction to the 30% reduction offered 
conditionally, and setting an ambitious reduction target for 2030. While there has not been internal 
European agreement on raising the pre-2020 target, agreement was reached on acknowledging the 
inadequacy of the current target and the need to revise it, through ministerial discussions with other 
countries in Warsaw. Regarding the 2030 target, a proactive group of 13 EU environment ministers, the 
Green Growth Group, is a driving force towards promoting low-carbon development and a 50% reduction 
target by 2030. However, this group does not represent a majority in the 28-member EU and is 
counterweighted by strong opponents of ambitious action, such as Poland and other new member 
states, as well as the energy directorate (Bankwatch Blog 2013; Hope 2013; UtilityWeek 2013). 
With regards to the upcoming UNFCCC negotiation round in November 2013 in Warsaw, the EU Council 
stresses the importance of mitigating GHG emissions, emphasizing that GHG emissions should peak by 
2020 and globally be scaled down by a minimum of 50% of their 1990 level by 2050. It also articulates 
the need for all parties to contribute significantly to make these targets achievable. It is also demanding 
that a multilaterally agreed common measurement, reporting and verification (MRV) framework be 
implemented in order to avoid the problems of loss of environmental integrity and double counting, 
restates the need to revamp existing market-based mechanisms and looks forward to the development 
of new ones as mitigation strategies. It maintains its resolve to work in co-ordination with other 
international parties on adaptation and work on analyzing which areas need to be considered for 
immediate action (Council of the European Union 2013; IISD 2013a).  
US 
Stern (the head of the US delegation) (2013) stresses that the 2015 agreement should be based on 
“nationally determined mitigation commitments” consistent with countries’ own circumstances and 
capabilities. Initial commitments and explanations of why governments believe their proposed 
commitment is fair and adequate would be reviewed by governments and other stakeholders during a 
“consultative or assessment period”, and could then be finalized. The dichotomy of industrialized and 
developing country annexes should be replaced by “a single operational system differentiated across the 
spectrum of countries”. The US, in addition, opposes the strong MRV and accounting system advocated 
by the EU, and prefers a more flexible system without any compliance procedures (Herold et al. 2013). 
Regarding climate finance, the position withdraws even behind the Copenhagen Accord stating “no step 
change in overall levels of public funding from developed countries is likely to come anytime soon”, and 
that leveraging of private finance is the only realistic approach (Stern 2013). 
Japan 
Japan proposes a “pledge and review” system bolstered by a transparency mechanism with ex-ante 
consultation as well as ex-post international evaluation and review of each Party’s performance based 
on internationally agreed rules (European Parliament 2013). Its highest priority is that the future 
mitigation agreement includes all major emitters, also from the developing countries, and is applicable to 
all countries. It proposes a global mitigation commitment for 2050 of 50% and 80% for industrialized 
countries. 
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Russia 
Russia is not participating in the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, because it wants 
legally “locked” mitigation commitments for all large emitters, including Annex I and rapidly industrializing 
developing countries (European Parliament 2013). In addition, it argues that its specific national 
circumstances (cold climate, large country, economic reliance on energy trade and heavy industry, and 
growth-oriented focus) need to be taken into account, and that special rules for economies in transition 
should continue in the future. Its current emissions pledge, of -15 to -25% reduction below 1990 levels, 
actually implies an increase in emissions from current (-33%) and projected BAU levels by 2020 (-30%) 
(Herold et al. 2013).   
 
3.2.2 Developing countries 
While with respect to climate finance, adaptation, loss and damage, technology and capacity building 
developing countries remain quite united, with common positions under the G77 umbrella or similar 
positions in their respective groups, in other topics an increasing differentiation across groups is 
emerging. For climate finance, developing countries call for the mobilization of public, new and additional 
sources of long-term finance, and for equitable distribution between mitigation and adaptation activities 
(Herold et al. 2013).  
African Group 
Active since the negotiations under the UNFCCC started in the early 1990s, the African Group is a 
regional coalition that aims to advance the interests of the 53 African states in the area of climate change 
by pooling resources and power in the UNFCCC negotiations (Roger 2013). Its level of activity and 
salience in the negotiations has been low for most of the past 20 years, mainly because the Group’s 
positions did not clearly distinguish themselves from those of the G77, and because of the poor 
negotiation capacity of its members. Over time, the Group became aware of the losses it had suffered as 
a result of failed participation in the negotiations: low competitiveness for the market-based CDM; low 
relevance of the issue of adaptation in the negotiations. At the same time, the issue of climate change 
also gained more political importance in the continent. As a result, in more recent years, the African 
Group started to become more vocal in the UNFCCC discussions. In COP 12 in Nairobi (2006), it 
achieved the launch of the Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation the 
Climate Change, and of the Nairobi Framework to improve African participation in the CDM. During COP 
15 in Copenhagen (2009), finally, the Group played an important part in the negotiations on climate 
finance, and earned considerable attention by the international press. In Durban, in 2011, they allied with 
the European Union, the LDCs and AOSIS to demand a comprehensive legally-binding agreement for 
2020, putting a clear distance between themselves and other developing countries (Roger 2013).  
The issues of highest importance for the African Group remain its need to overcome poverty and achieve 
sustainable development; a high level of vulnerability to climate change and need for adaptation, 
particularly in the area of agriculture and food security; the provision of finance to support adaptation and 
mitigation efforts in the region; a higher mitigation ambition by industrialized countries both for the pre- 
and the post-2020 period; and an unsatisfactory experience with the CDM (IISD 2013b; UN Economic 
Commission for Africa 2013). It explicitly calls for a global adaptation target. Annex II countries should 
take binding climate finance commitments. 
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AILAC 
The Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean states first became formally active during 
COP 18 in Doha (2012), comprising a group of middle-income countries – Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, 
Guatemala, Panama and Peru, with the support of the Dominican Republic – that have already started 
ambitious mitigation policies at home and advocate low-carbon development by all. They stand out 
among the developing countries for their support to binding mitigation obligations for all countries, which 
clearly defies the typical G77 defense of the Annex I – non-Annex I division. In addition, however, they 
demand clarity on the finance pledges by industrialized countries, acknowledging that the provision of 
sufficient finance is a necessary catalyzer for trust and for more ambitious mitigation action by 
developing countries. Their negotiating strategy is to be constructive and open to dialogue with others, 
and to show proactively that middle-income countries can also display leadership in climate change 
action without having to wait for others to pledge reductions or provide financial support (Roberts and 
Edwards 2012; AILAC 2013). AILAC calls for defining a structure of the 2015 agreement at the Warsaw 
COP. 
ALBA 
ALBA, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, consisting of Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
Nicaragua and Venezuela, holds the view that developed countries should pay their historical “climate 
debt” to developing countries and commit to very strong emission reductions. They also strongly oppose 
to the use of market mechanisms to facilitate the achievement of emission reduction targets, denounce 
the consumerist lifestyle and the capitalist economy for their role in causing climate change, and plea for 
a development model based on respect for “Mother Earth” and nature. The ALBA countries were among 
those few UNFCCC parties that persistently opposed the approval of the Copenhagen Accord at COP 
15, arguing that the procedure to negotiate it was non-inclusive and illegitimate, and that it falls very 
short on delivering the needed legal strength and ambition to effectively mitigate climate change. Their 
tactics include blocking the negotiations and having a confrontational style with strong language and 
hard bargaining strategies (Greenpeace 2009; Roberts and Edwards 2012). However, from COP 16 
onwards only Bolivia continued the hard-core blockade, and was overridden. 
AOSIS 
The Alliance of Small Island States formed already in 1990 with the aim of defending island state 
interests in the UNFCCC negotiations, particularly in view of their high vulnerability to climate change 
and their lack of political weight. AOSIS held from the beginning a unified and strong voice, which led 
them to early successes in the negotiations, such as gaining a special seat in several bodies under the 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, obtaining special consideration of the needs of particularly 
vulnerable countries, and achieving a review of the Convention goals to consider the aim of keeping 
average temperature rise below 1.5ºC (Betzold 2010; Betzold et al. 2012).   
However, recent research has shown that this coalition has found it difficult to remain unified to the same 
degree, due to the recent multiplication of issues under negotiation and the emerging new interests 
among different subgroups of island states. While in the main topics of interest for island states – 
achieving strong and binding mitigation targets, getting sufficient finance for adaptation and 
implementing a mechanism for compensating losses and damages from climate impacts already 
occurring – AOSIS maintains a unified voice, some other topics such as REDD and land use change 
have started to cause disagreements within the group (Betzold et al. 2012).  
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With respect to the negotiations towards a post-2020 agreement under the ADP, AOSIS on the one hand 
emphasizes the fact that the new agreement should be applicable to all parties, with all parties 
participating in mitigation. On the other, the Alliance points out that the new agreement should respect 
the principles of the Convention, including those of historical responsibility and common but 
differentiated responsibilities: “The goal of the ADP is not to re-write or re-negotiate the Convention or its 
principles and provisions. In this regard, the Annexes are an integral part of the Framework Convention” 
(AOSIS 2013). It seems hence that despite their call for stronger mitigation ambition, AOSIS still 
supports the G 77 position of keeping the traditional division between developing and industrialized 
countries. It calls for an Annex I mitigation commitment of -45% for 2020 and -90% for 2050 compared to 
1990. 
BASIC 
BASIC advocates a continuation of the dichotomy between developing and developed countries, 
although they do recognize the need for (differentiated) commitments by all countries. They also demand 
that the ADP process should not only address mitigation, but give equal importance to adaptation, 
finance, technology and transparency of action and support, and underscore that fulfillment of developed 
countries’ existing financial and mitigation commitments, as well as closing the finance and mitigation 
gaps is necessary for building trust in the post-2020 negotiations (BASIC 2013). Within BASIC, however, 
individual country positions are somewhat differentiated. South Africa and Brazil are progressive, China 
and India defensive. Brazil proposes that COP 19 shall launch domestic processes for the definition of 
commitments, that parties shall come up with pledges in the course of 2014 and that a process for 
multilateral considerations of commitments shall be established. South Africa proposes multilaterally 
agreed criteria for the latter and stresses that absolute targets and zero emission pathways should apply 
for developed countries and relative emission reduction commitments and actions for developing 
countries. It also calls for elimination of fossil fuel subsidies. Brazil also wants that early action during the 
pre-2020 period will be accounted for under the 2015 agreement, but opposes review or strengthened 
MRV of NAMAs. China and India oppose mitigation commitments for developing countries.  
With regards to adaptation, South Africa proposes a global adaptation target. 
Central American Integration System (SICA) 
SICA groups several Central American countries (Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama and Dominican Republic), which seek to get recognition as highly 
vulnerable countries. Their main concern lies therefore on adaptation and the provision of finance for 
adaptation, although they also plea for strong mitigation commitments by industrialized countries and 
voluntary mitigation action by developing ones. SICA has not made any submission under the ADP so 
far. 
LDCs 
LDCs call for mitigation action by all countries but differentiated between industrialized countries, 
countries in transition, middle income countries, highly vulnerable countries and LDCs. Quantitative and 
qualitative criteria should guide the definition of commitments, such as historical responsibility, future 
development needs and vulnerabilities; an equity reference framework is requested. Transparency is 
seen as important as well as maintaining a balance between mitigation and adaptation. LDCs argue for 
strong MRV comparable to that of the KP. 
EC-FP7 Project  
Grant Agreement no.: 603847 
Mobilizing and transferring knowledge on post-
2012 climate policy implications (POLIMP) 
 
D2.1. Report on stakeholder mapping Page 30 
 
Like-minded Developing Countries 
This group formed in October 2012 and consists of Bolivia, China, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Malaysia, 
Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand and Venezuela as well as up to 20 other 
developing countries in varying configurations depending on the issues at stake. It is a reaction to the 
Cartagena dialogue as well as to the cooperation between the EU, AOSIS and small and least 
developed countries in Durban. Essentially, it opposes any commitments for developing countries while 
asking for upscaled climate finance, ideally not through market mechanisms. 
Middle East / OPEC 
While no longer contesting climate change science, OPEC countries led by Saudi Arabia oppose 
commitments for developing countries as well as guidelines for domestic MRV of unilateral NAMAs. 
They also still uphold the principle of taking into account negative impacts of mitigation policies 
(“response measures” in negotiation jargon). 
Coalition for Rainforest Nations 
The Coalition for Rainforest Nations is an official intergovernmental organization that brings together 41 
developing countries with tropical rainforest resources with the goal of protecting these forests while 
achieving social and economic development. Within the UNFCCC, their main goal is to advance REDD+ 
activities and to achieve sufficient financing for REDD activities, including also through the use of 
markets.  
Consequently, also under the ADP negotiations on a post-2020 agreement they ask for the inclusion of a 
mechanism to advance REDD+ activities and to promote the provision of finance for them. In addition, 
as a way to enhance the mitigation ambition before 2020, they propose a stronger focus on identifying 
and operationalizing the mitigation potential of forest-related activities (Coalition for Rainforest Nations 
2013).  
 
3.2.3 Coalitions bridging Annex I and non-Annex I countries 
Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action 
Despite not being an official negotiating bloc, the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action stands out 
as a progressive group with a broad membership that breaks the dividing lines between Annex I and 
non-Annex I. Created in 2010 as an informal discussion group between progressive countries on both 
sides of the North-South divide, such as the AILAC nations, Australia, Ethiopia, France, Germany, 
Ghana, Indonesia, New Zealand, Samoa, the UK and the European Commission, the Cartagena 
Dialogue seeks to help the negotiations move forward towards creating an ambitious and legally-binding 
regime. To achieve this goal, it attempts to find areas of convergence between members of the different 
negotiation blocs, who nonetheless have different positions and goals. Through its informal character 
and the joint goal of achieving progress in the negotiations, it has managed to create a honest, 
facilitative and trustworthy atmosphere in which participants can talk freely and actually engage in 
dialogue about their positions. So far, 47 countries have attended the Cartagena Dialogue’s meetings at 
least once, with about 30 of them participating always. The Dialogue meets about 3 times along the year 
and then daily during the UNFCCC COPs (Araya 2011; Pineda 2012).  
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Environmental Integrity Group 
The EIG consist of Liechtenstein, Mexico, South Korea and Switzerland. It is the oldest negotiation group 
– established in 2000 - containing both industrialized and developing countries. It proposes commitments 
consistent with the 2° target. It supports international MRV rules for commitments as well as stringent 
rules for the new market-based mechanism. REDD+ should generate offset credits. Fossil fuel subsidies 
should be phased out. 
 
3.3 Possible paths for change 
The historical map of country coalitions drawn above and the current division of negotiation positions, 
particularly among the developing country parties to the UNFCCC indicate potential for new dynamics in 
the negotiations.  
It seems likely that the current trend towards fragmentation of negotiation blocs and of positions helps to 
pave the way to a new agreement that moves away from the Annex I – non-Annex I dichotomy of the 
1990s to a continuum of differentiated engagement of all parties in terms of mitigation (and potentially 
other) commitments, although the most recent COP decisions of Cancun, Durban and Doha continued to 
apply a distinction between developed and developing countries. Of course, the overarching principles of 
the Convention will need to be respected, such as the concept of common but differentiated 
responsibilities, which is very deeply rooted in the UNFCCC discourse and in other international 
environmental agreements. It institutionalizes the recognition that different countries have indeed 
contributed to a very different extent to the problem, that they will also suffer its consequences differently 
due to distinct vulnerability profiles, and that they have different capabilities to act. A future solution 
needs to incorporate these differences and deal with the equity and fairness question, and both 
progressive negotiators and experts external to the process have already made various proposals of 
how such a solution could look like.  
Other important factors that need to be considered when looking forward are the balance of power 
between the different coalitions – is it at all possible to get BASIC and OPEC countries to accept an end 
of the Annex I/non-Annex I division? – and the evolution of the application of the consensus decision-
making rule. The last few COPs have shown that consensus does not necessarily mean unanimity, for 
example when the opposition by Bolivia to the outcomes of COP 16 in Cancun was overruled by all other 
countries – including Venezuela, their closest ally. But they have also shown that individual powerful 
parties do have the means to disrupt the process if their opposition is not taken into account – as has 
been the case with the Russian reaction after its attempt (together with Belarus and Ukraine) to block a 
decision on limiting the acceptance of existing surplus emission allowances in the future. After being 
overruled by the COP President in December 2012 in Qatar, in the intersessional meeting in June 2013 
Russia blocked the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) by insisting upon the need to include an 
additional agenda item on procedures in its workplan. As disagreement with this proposal ensued, SBI 
could not even start working on its planned agenda.  
If future decisions, crucially on the new post-2020 agreement, can only be made by overruling the 
opposition of few laggards, then the application of the consensus rule will need to be clarified to avoid a 
potential deadlock. 
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4 Conclusions 
Over the 20 years of international climate policy, a complex system of stakeholder interaction on multiple 
levels – the international, multilateral, national and subnational – has developed. Frequently, policy 
instruments for climate change mitigation are triggered by a cascade of decision-making. On each level, 
various interest groups try to influence decision-making. Despite all ups and downs of the negotiation 
process and the emergence of competing multilateral fora, the UNFCCC has remained the pivot. A wide 
range of stakeholders participates in the UNFCCC negotiations and provides different types of inputs – 
from position papers to analytical support of delegations. Stakeholder participation has continuously 
increased over time.  
However, the failure of the Copenhagen conference in 2009 needed to be “repaired” through a patient 
process, which has not been completed yet. Only a success, as pursued by the EU, in agreeing on a 
2015 agreement covering all countries would put an end to this repair process but essentially means a 
loss of one decade compared to the situation if Copenhagen had delivered a treaty. There is a clear 
tendency towards a “pledge and review” mitigation policy. It is unclear how it will generate the level of 
ambition needed to put the world on a 2°C target path. A failure of the 2015 process would put the focus 
on options outside of the UNFCCC. To date, these options have not really performed well.  
The likelihood to get an agreement in 2015 that overcomes the strict Annex I / non-Annex I distinction is 
increasing due to the fact that the hitherto solid block of developing countries in form of the G 77 has 
increasingly split up into smaller groups. Nowadays, the same country can be member of various 
thematic and regional groups. Some groups now even include both industrialized and developing 
countries. A wider differentiation than the Annex I/Non-Annex I dichotomy seems possible, but needs 
careful work on interpretation of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities”. 
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